Control Mechanism for All-Optical Components, Journal of Telecommunications and Information Technology, 2009, nr 1 by Leeson, Mark S. & Rejeb, Ridha
Invited paper Control Mechanism
for All-Optical Components
Ridha Rejeb and Mark S. Leeson
Abstract—In this article, we give a brief overview of secu-
rity and management issues that arise in all-optical networks
(AONs). Then we present an outline of the multiple attack
localization and identification (MALI) algorithm that can par-
ticipate in some of the tasks for fault management in AONs.
Consequently, we discuss a hardware-based control unit that
can be embedded in AON nodes to accelerate the performance
of the MALI algorithm. We conclude the article with a discus-
sion concerning the applicability and implementation of this
device in AON management systems.
Keywords— all-optical networks, fault and performance man-
agement, securing optical networks.
1. Introduction
Network management is an indispensable constituent of
communication systems since it is responsible for ensuring
the secure and proper operation of any network. Specif-
ically, a network management implementation should be
capable of handling the configuration, fault, performance,
security, accounting, and safety in the network. However,
network management for all-optical networks (AONs) faces
additional challenges such as performance monitoring and
ensuring adequate quality of service (QoS) guarantees in
the network. Performance management is germane to suc-
cessful AON operation since it provides signal quality mea-
surements at very low bit error rates and fault diagnostic
support. In particular, signal quality monitoring is difficult
in AONs as the analogue nature of optical signals means
that miscellaneous transmission impairments aggregate and
can impact the signal quality enough to reduce the QoS
without precluding all network services. This results in
the continuous monitoring and identification of the impair-
ments becoming challenging in the event of transmission
failures.
The presence of a network management system (NMS) is
essential to ensure efficient, secure, and continuous oper-
ation of any network. Specifically it handles the manage-
ment of configuration, fault, performance, accounting, and
security aspects, which are usually interlinked to one other.
A key component in this system is performance manage-
ment as it provides signal quality measurements at very
low bit error rates and fault diagnostic support for fault
management. Performance management is still a major
complication for AONs, particularly, because signal quality
monitoring in them is too difficult as the analogue nature
of optical signals means that miscellaneous transmission
impairments aggregate and can impact the signal quality
enough to reduce the QoS without precluding all network
services. This results in the continuous monitoring and
identification of the impairments becoming challenging in
the event of transmission failures. However, a simple and
reliable signal quality monitoring method does not exist
at present. Despite new methods for detection and local-
ization of transmission failures having been proposed, no
robust standards or techniques exist to date for guaranteeing
the QoS in AONs. Therefore, the need for expert diagnos-
tic techniques and more sophisticated management mecha-
nisms that assist managing the proper function of AONs is
highly desirable [1]–[7].
In this article, Sections 2 and 3 give a brief overview on the
security and management issues that may arise in AONs.
Section 4 introduces the control plane architectures tak-
ing into consideration still open and unsolved development
issues. Section 5 presents an outline of the multiple at-
tack localization and identification (MALI) algorithm [8]
that can participate in some of the tasks for fault manage-
ment in AONs. Section 6 discusses the efficiency of this
algorithm focusing on its cost and complexity. Section 7
presents a hardware-based control unit [9] that can be em-
bedded in AON nodes, in order to process the MALI’s
localization procedures in a real time fashion. Finally, in
Section 8, we conclude the article with a discussion con-
cerning the applicability and implementation of this device
in AON management systems.
2. Security Issues in AONs
AONs are emerging as a promising technology for very
high data rates, flexible switching and broadband applica-
tion support. Specifically, they provide transparency ca-
pabilities and new features allowing routing and switching
of traffic without any regression or modification of signals
within the network. Although AONs offer many advan-
tages for high data rate communications, they have unique
features and requirements in terms of security and manage-
ment that distinguish them from traditional communication
networks. In particular, the unique characteristics of AON
components and network architectures bring forth a set of
new challenges for network security. By their nature, AON
components are particularly vulnerable to various forms of
denial of service, QoS degradation, and eavesdropping at-
tacks. Since even short (in terms of duration) faults and
attacks can cause large amounts of data to be lost, the need
for securing and protecting optical networks has become
increasingly significant [1], [2].
In the context of this work, a security attack is defined as an
intentional action against the proper and secure functioning
57
Ridha Rejeb and Mark S. Leeson
of the network, whereas a fault is defined as an uninten-
tional action against the ideal and secure functioning of
the network. Failures are referred to as the faults and at-
tacks that can interrupt the ideal functioning of the network.
Security attacks upon AONs may range from a simple phys-
ical access to more complex attacks exploiting:
– the peculiar behaviors of optical fibers;
– the unique characteristics of AON components;
– the shortcomings of available supervisory techniques
and monitoring methods.
Attacks can be classified as eavesdropping or service dis-
ruption [1]. In this scenario, they are different in nature
ranging from malicious users (i.e., users inserting higher
signal power) to eavesdroppers. Thus, attacks differ from
conventional faults and should be therefore be treated dif-
ferently. This is because they appear and disappear sporadi-
cally and can be launched elsewhere in the network. In par-
ticular, the attacker may thwart simple detection methods,
which are in general not sensitive enough to detect small
and sporadic performance degradations. Furthermore, a dis-
ruptive attack, which is erroneously identified as a compo-
nent failure, can spread rapidly through the network caus-
ing additional failures and triggering multiple erroneous
alarms. Security attacks therefore must be detected and
identified at any node in the network where they may oc-
cur [2]. Moreover, the speed of attack detection and local-
ization must be commensurate with the data transmission
rate. Furthermore, transparency in AONs may introduce
significant miscellaneous transmission impairments such
as optical crosstalk, amplified spontaneous emission noise,
and power divergence [3]. In AONs, those impairments
accumulate as they propagate and can impact the signal
quality so that the received bit error rate at the destination
node might become unacceptable high.
3. Management Issues in AONs
Following from the previous sections, it is clear that net-
work management for AONs faces additional challenges
and still unsolved problems. One of the main premises of
AONs is the establishment of a robust and flexible con-
trol plane for managing network resources, provisioning
lightpaths, and maintaining them across multiple control
domains. Such a control plane must have the ability to se-
lect lightpaths for requested end-to-end connections, assign
wavelengths to these lightpaths, and configure the appro-
priate resources in the network. Furthermore, it should be
able to provide updates for link state information to reflect
which wavelengths are currently being used on which fiber
links so that routers and switches may make updated rout-
ing decisions. An important issue that arises in this regard
is how to address the trade-off between service quality and
resource utilization. Addressing this issue requires different
scheduling and sharing mechanisms to maximize resource
utilization while ensuring adequate QoS guarantees. One
possible solution is the aggregation of traffic flows to max-
imize the optical throughput and to reduce operational and
capital costs, taking into account qualities of optical trans-
mission in addition to protection and restoration schemes to
ensure adequate service differentiation and QoS assurance.
A control plane should therefore offer dynamic provisioning
and accurate performancemonitoring, plus efficient restora-
tion in the network and most of these functions need to
move to the optical domain. Connection provisioning, for
example, should enable a fast automatic setup and teardown
of lightpaths across the network thereby allowing dynamic
reconfiguration of traffic patterns without conversion to the
electrical domain [5]–[7].
Another related issue arises from the fact that the imple-
mentation of a control plane requires information exchange
between the control and management entities involved in
the control process. To achieve this, fast signaling channels
need to be in place between switching nodes. These chan-
nels might be used to exchange up-to-date control informa-
tion that is needed for managing all supported connections
and performing other control functions. In general, control
channels can be realized in different ways; one might be im-
plemented in-band while another may be implemented out-
of-band. There are, however, compelling reasons for de-
coupling control channels from their associated data links.
An important reason for this is that data traffic carried in
the optical domain is transparently switched to increase the
efficiency of the network and there is thus no need for
switching nodes to have any understanding of the protocol
stacks used for handling the control information. Another
reason is that there may not be any active channels avail-
able while the data links are still in use, for example, when
bringing one or more control channels down gracefully for
maintenance purposes. From a management point of view,
it is unacceptable to teardown a data traffic link, simply be-
cause the control channel is no longer available. Moreover,
between a pair of switching nodes there may be multiple
data links and it is therefore more efficient to manage these
as a bundle using a single separated out-of-band control
channel [6].
4. Control Plane Architectures
The design of an optical network is an important and
very practical issue. As stated above, a desirable archi-
tecture should feature, inter alia, flexible management, au-
tomatic lightpath protection and restoration, and the ability
to compile an inventory. Moreover, network architectures
should support the gradual introduction of new technolo-
gies into the network without time consuming and costly
changes to embedded technologies. However, the network
architectures currently used may be categorized in two main
models, namely the overlay model and the peer model.
Although both models consist essentially of an optical
core that provides wavelength services to client interfaces,
which reside at the edges of the network, they are intrinsi-
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Fig. 1. Control plane management architecture.
cally different and offer up two key concepts for managing
traffic flows in the network [10].
The overlay model hides the internal elements of the optical
network and thus requires two separate, yet interoperable,
control mechanisms for provisioning and managing optical
services in the network. One mechanism operates within
the core optical network and the other acts as the inter-
face between the core components and the edge compo-
nents which support lightpaths that are either dynamically
signaled across the core optical network or statically pro-
visioned without seeing inside the topology of the core.
The overlay model therefore imposes additionally control
boundaries between the core and edge by effectively hiding
the contents of the core network.
The peer model considers the network as a single do-
main, opening the internal entities of the core optical net-
work to the edge components making the internal topology
visible and able to participate in provisioning and rout-
ing decisions. Whilst this has the advantage of providing
a unified control plane, there are some significant consid-
erations:
• The availability of topological information to all
components in the network makes this model less
secure.
• New standard control mechanisms are required since
available proprietary ones cannot be employed.
• Additionally approaches for traffic protection and
restoration are required.
Another model, known as the hybrid model, combines both
the overlay and peer approaches, taking advantages from
both models and providing more flexibility. In this model,
some edge components serve as peers to the core network
and share the same instance of a common control mech-
anism with the core network through the network-network
interface (NNI). Other edge components could have their
own control plane (or a separate instance of the control
plane used by the core network), and interface with the
core network through the user-network interface (UNI).
From a control plane point of view, the notion of the con-
trol domain is very useful. The control plane management
architecture is presented in Fig. 1. The UNI is the interface
between a node in the client network and a node in the
core optical network. The NNI is the interface between two
nodes in different control domains. The management infor-
mation base is distributed among control domains, each of
which has a partial knowledge of the global control infor-
mation. A large optical network, as shown in Fig. 1, may
be portioned into moderate control domains mainly for the
following reasons [10]:
• To enforce administrative, management and protocol
boundaries making them sufficiently reliable.
• To ensure rapid and accurate actions to be taken in re-
sponse to failed conditions. For example, performing
failure localizing processes in commensurate time.
• To increase the scalability of management functions
and control planes.
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Fig. 2. The MIB distributed among element management sys-
tems.
The management information base (MIB) in a typical do-
main, as shown in Fig. 2, is distributed among its ele-
ment management systems where each one has only a par-
tial knowledge of the whole domain control and manage-
ment information. However, there are still open and un-
solved problems in the development of secure AONs that
should be carefully addressed. One particular security is-
sue is related to the UNI and NNI within the control plane
employed. Consequently, the analysis of protocol stacks
from a security perspective is an important prerequisite.
Another issue related to network protection is a compara-
tive study of the trade-off between network complexity and
traffic restoration time.
5. The MALI Algorithm
This section presents an outline of the MALI algorithm
that can participate in some of the tasks for fault man-
agement in AONs. The main task of the algorithm is to
correlate multiple security failures and attacks locally at
any AON node and to discover their tracks through the
network. The MALI algorithm is distributed and relies
on a reliable management system such as the link man-
agement protocol [11], since its overall success depends
upon correct message passing and processing at the local
nodes.
The key concepts of the MALI algorithm are based on
the optical cross-connect (OXC) node model proposed
in [8]. This model defines an OXC node as a 7-tuple
OXC = (F, W, D, S, M, χ , µ), where F , W , D, S, and M
are nonempty component sets of fiber ports, supported
wavelengths, wavelength demultiplexers, optical switches,
and wavelength multiplexers, respectively. The main key
functions of the OXC node model are represented by χ
and µ . These are responsible for updating the connection
and monitoring information of all established lightpaths
that copropagate through the OXC node simultaneously.
The model denotes the numbers of fiber ports and sup-
ported wavelengths by n and m, respectively. To identify
the source and nature of detected performance degradation,
the algorithm makes particular use of up-to-date connec-
tion and monitoring information of any established light-
path, on the input and output side of each node in the
network. The required monitoring information can be cor-
related at local nodes or acquired from remote monitoring
nodes [12].
The majority of the MALI algorithm comprises a generic
localization procedure, which will be initiated at the down-
stream node that first detects serious performance degrada-
tion at an arbitrary lightpath on its output side.
A downstream node, which first notices serious perfor-
mance degradation at a disturbed lightpath, raises an alarm,
indicating that a failure has been detected on its output
side. It then determines the set of lightpaths that share the
same output fiber with the disturbed lightpath. For each of
these, it determines the set of lightpaths that pass through
the same optical switch at the same time. Hence, it del-
egates the localization process to the next upstream node
when the status of a lightpath channel is nonzero on the
input side of the node. Otherwise, it terminates the local-
ization process for this lightpath and notifies the NMS that
the disturbed channel is most likely to be affected in the
current node.
An upstream node that receives the localization process
with a disturbed lightpath starts the localization procedure
from scratch and repeats all the steps when the channel
status of the disturbed lightpath is nonzero on the output
side of the node. Otherwise, it terminates the localization
process and notifies the NMS indicating that the failure is
most likely to be at the optical fiber link interconnecting
both upstream and downstream nodes.
The localization procedure provides the NMS with state
information about locations of possible disruption failures
and attacks through the network. This information can be
included as part of the failure notification. Once the origins
of the detected failures have been localized, the NMS can
then make accurate decisions (for example, which offender
lightpaths should be disconnected or rerouted) to achieve
finer grained recovery switching actions.
6. Cost and Complexity Analysis
Analyzing the cost and complexity of an algorithm has
come to mean predicting the resources that the algorithm
requires. Occasionally, resources such as memory, commu-
nication bandwidth, or hardware equipment are of prime
concern, but most often it is computational time that we
want to measure. The running time of the MALI’s localiza-
tion procedure is the sum of running times for each state-
ment executed. For the worst-case, in which it is assumed
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that an OXC node is fully loaded and that any lightpath
can affect any other co-propagating lightpath of one form
or another, it can be seen that the local running time of
the localization procedure is of the order O(m · n). The
major concern, however, is estimating the overall running
time of the required recursive calls of the localization pro-
cedure when delegating the localization process to the next
upstream nodes backwards through the network [9].
As stated in the previous section, the MALI’s localization
process is triggered immediately in the downstream node
after detecting a failure. Then, it is delegated to certain
upstream nodes involved in the localization process. As
shown in Fig. 3, these nodes can be modeled as a rooted
tree. The downstream node, which first notices the perfor-
mance degradation on its output side, is referred to as the
root node. The number of children of a node is called its
degree. Thus, the maximal degree of any node is equal to
the number of its input ports. The length of a localization
path from the root node to an arbitrary node is called its
depth in the tree. The height of a node in the tree is the
number of links on the longest path from the node to a leaf.
The height of the tree is the height of its root node and is
equal to the largest depth in the tree.
Fig. 3. Localization path tree.
Due to the distributed nature of the localization process
it is expected that the localization procedure will be per-
formed synchronously in all nodes of the same depth stage
in the localization tree. Thus, the expected overall worst-
case running time of the localization process is of the order
h ·O(m · n), where h denotes the height of the localiza-
tion tree. The height h is random since it depends on the
distribution of upstream nodes involved in the localization
process. Thus, it might impact the overall performance
of the localization process particularly when it is becomes
large [9].
7. Hardware Based Control Unit
In the previous section we saw that the local running time
of the MALI’s localization procedure is nonlinear, of the
order O(m ·n). However, to reduce the computational time
required for running this procedure, it is reasonable to
process some of computing steps in a parallel way. One of
the significant conditions for running the localization pro-
cedure is that the computing steps required can be per-
formed independently from each other. Since the local-
ization procedure merely uses the current connection and
channel state information at the input and/or output sides
of the current node [8], it is not necessary to process it in
a sequential way.
An optimal solution to solve this issue is to use a hardware-
based control unit that can be embedded in AON nodes
to process the localization procedure in a real time fash-
ion. The device determines in one-step the set of estab-
lished lightpaths that share the same output fiber with the
disturbed lightpath at the same time. For each of these
lightpaths, it checks the state of lightpaths that copropa-
gate through the optical switch simultaneously. Hence, the
computational time required is proportional to the number
of wavelengths supported in the node.
Fig. 4. Number of operation and execution time as a function of
established lightpaths in 64×64-OXC node.
The performance evaluation of this approach is shown in
Fig. 4. The internal design and simulation of this device
was performed by a hardware simulation tool with a fre-
quency of 323 MHz. The lower line shows the number
of operations as a function of established lightpaths that
share the same output fiber with the disturbed lightpath,
whilst the upper plots the running time required for pro-
cessing these steps. Both dotted lines are plotted with
estimated values which are computed using higher fre-
quences of 400 MHz and 500 MHz, respectively. The
values are given by time ∼ number of operation/frequency.
Both curves show unambiguously that the running time is
decreasing as the frequency is increasing. Compared to
the sequential approach, it is apparent that this method is
more advantageous offering the benefit of reducing the run-
ning time required for processing the MALI’s localization
procedure. The resulting computational time is linear of
the order O(n), where n is the number of wavelengths
supported in the node. Thus, it may ensure relaxation of
the high cost and complexity of signal quality monitoring
in AONs.
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8. Conclusion
In this paper, we have presented a brief overview of the
security and management issues that may arise in AONs.
Then we have introduced the MALI algorithm that can be
used for localizing the origins of multiple failures and se-
curity attacks upon AONs in a distributed manner. Con-
sequently, we discussed a hardware-based control unit that
can be embedded in AON nodes to process the MALI’s
localization procedures in a real time fashion. As a di-
rect consequence, this device can participate in some tasks
for fault management of AONs offering the benefit of
relaxing the high cost and complexity of signal quality
monitoring.
Although this approach may offer several benefits, there
are several related issues that require further consideration.
First, design concepts for the functional relationship be-
tween the hardware-based control unit and available man-
agement systems should be questioned. In particular, the
development of efficient schemes for performance degrada-
tion resistant network control and management algorithms
should be taken into consideration. Second, available and
proposed control and management protocols that provi-
sion lightpaths within the network may be investigated and
where necessary tailored to the control unit.
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